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Can the Antarctic Treaty Create Erga Omnes Obligations Enforceable 
Under International Law Applicable to Third Party States? 
 
The ability to enforce treaty obligations on third party States has always been a complex and 
difficult task legally. The Antarctic Treaty is no different and comes with further 
complications as there is no sovereign body, with overall control of the region, to champion 
the process. Further, it is recognised widely that Antarctica plays a fundamental role in the 
environmental health of the globe, and plays a vital role as a laboratory where scientific 
research is carried out to address issues that impact the whole world. The following are two 
of those issues: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the southern oceans and the 
growing hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica. In the instances above, and others, the issue 
of enforceability on third party states becomes so much more relevant.  
This essay will explore the Antarctic Treaty and only two of many doctrines of international 
law, with regard to the Antarctic treaty and explore their ability to enforce erga omnes 
obligations. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty 
 
The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 by twelve countries that were all active 
scientifically, in Antarctica, during the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year. The treaty 
came into force in 1961 and currently has 48 signatory parties. However, only 28 of the 
signatory parties have voting power
1
. Currently, there are 144 countries not party to the 
Antarctic Treaty. 
The Antarctic Treaty requires its signatories to use Antarctica for peaceful purposes only. 
There is a total prohibition on weapons testing and military measures. Nuclear explosions and 
the disposal of radioactive waste material are prohibited in Antarctica
 2
.  The treaty parties 
have an obligation to act in good faith and not frustrate the treaty's object and purpose or 
commit any flagrant breaches
3
. 
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It is argued that despite the lack of sovereignty over Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty cannot 
be considered invalid or ultra vires by the international community and it is simply not 
realistic for any third party nations to do so
4
. 
There have been attempts to discredit the legal validity of the Antarctic Treaty through 
academic means; in the context of statements that Antarctica is part of a global commons, or 
is the common heritage of mankind. However, these doctrines have been considered more 
politically than legally relevant
5
. In addition, there is an argument that only a quarter of the 
world’s states are party to the treaty so its validity is questionable, but this does not constitute 
a basis for questioning the legality of the Antarctic Treaty
6
.  
In recent years it has been third world nations questioning the Antarctic Treaty. Malaysia has 
been at the forefront, and with its allies has objected to the Treaty and taken a stance against 
the legitimacy of the Treaty in the international setting. One argument raised was that at the 
time of the original signing, much of the third world was under colonial rule. This raises 
questions over if those colonies took a stance in support of their own interests or of their 
colonial masters. In the case of Britain for instance, which has a long standing interest in the 
region, many difficult questions have been raised.  Further the presence of apartheid ruled 
South Africa, in the Antarctic Treaty, was considered to be morally offensive by many 
contributing nations. The Antarctic Treaty has endured however, by engaging with those 
actors in institutional settings such as the United Nations General Assembly and by being 
sufficiently flexible. The result has been that the demands of the international community 
have been largely addressed
7
 though there does remain work to be done. 
While not universally ratified, there is significant participation by third party States through 
accession. This is open to all third party States who wish to accede to the treaties core values. 
State practice also makes it clear that treaties concluded between limited groups of States are 
legally recognised in international law and can have legal consequences for non participating 
States. Therefore, if the Antarctic Treaty is a legitimate and valid treaty, it follows that third 
party States cannot ignore it or treat it as nonexistent.
8
 Since Antarctica is beyond the 
territorial sovereignty of any State, no injured State can seek remedies for any breach of the 
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Obligations Erga Omnes?  
 
In International Law “obligation erga omnes” is a legal term describing certain legal duties 
that are owed to all States by all States. The concept was recognised in the Barcelona 
Traction case
10
 of 1972, in which the International Court of Justice identified in obiter 
dictum, a category of international obligations called erga omnes
11
. These obligations 
intended to protect and promote the basic values and common interests of all. The scope of 




The Antarctic Treaty’s Applicability to Non State Parties for Obligations 
Erga Omnes  
 
In discussing the possibility of a special body of laws for Antarctica, which can create 
obligations erga omnes from the Antarctic Treaty the following two theories will be 
discussed; Law of Treaties Approach and Special Laws for Antarctica. 
Law of Treaties Approach. 
 
The Law of Treaties Approach seeks to establish objective regimes as an exception to the res 
inter alios acta and the pacta tertiis rules. It is has been recognised that some kinds of treaties 
are established for the object they regulate, a regime which concerns and can potentially bind 
third party States. States that have a particular interest in a subject can join together to 
establish a special regional international law. This has been done in the case of management 
of international rivers and of special territories. Charney points out that in the Asylum case the 
International Court of Justice acknowledged that States in a region could establish special 
rules of behaviour
13
. It can also be explained that some treaties produce effects beyond the 
community of signatories because these States assume the role of a de facto international 
legislator
14
. Antarctica has often been described and recognised as a region controlled by 
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such a treaty. It is strongly argued that this is not possible and can only work where there has 
been consent to be bound, however the contra position is that under certain conditions such 
objective regimes can be established. There has been recognition of cases where some States 
establish norms applicable in some way to others but this is limited, and typically the 
legislating State(s) actually have Sovereignty over the territory in question
15
. 
The Vienna Convention provides that third party States can be bound by international 
agreements if there exists an intention by the party States to bind such non-party States and 
that those third States have consented to be bound. This is the essence of accession in 
international law. However, it is of interest that in the Antarctic Treaty itself only United 
Nations member States can accede to the Antarctic Treaty or where a non-United Nations 




Authors such as Klein argue that, in relation to the Antarctic Treaty, legal capacity may be 
conferred by a signatory State upon itself based on explicit treaty provisions such as Article 
X 
17
. This can be taken from a general interest that a State may have in a region, or from the 
participation by the treaty States themselves who have territorial competence and specialist 
knowledge in relation to the subject matter. He also states that Article X amounted to an 
assertion of competence, which was accepted by States which early on raised no objection
18
. 
According to Gerald legitimacy of erga omnes effects on a territorial regime depends upon 
the participation of all States interested in the establishment or entitled to participate in it. The 
“Antarctic Club” would argue that anyone can participate in it. However participation 
requires a huge investment of money, as voting rights are only conferred if you are actively 
participating in Science in Antarctica. This is expenditure that some States simply can not 
afford to reasonably commit to
19
.  
Fitzmaurice believes that the Antarctic Treaty is an example of “participation in use, of a 
marine and land territory in which a treaty established an international regime”. He claims 
that the treaty establishes in a permanent manner, a joint system for use of a territory by both 
parties to the treaty as well as third party States. The manner of the use of the territory does 
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not breach any rights accorded to third party States on the basis of general international law 
and the parties to the treaty consist of all the interested States in the establishment of the 
regime together with the States that have territorial claims
20
. 
Despite this there are many arguments that can not be reconciled and deny the Antarctic 
Treaty has the necessary characteristics of an objective regime effective erga omnes
21
.  
Bruno Simma, now a presiding Judge in the International Court of Justice, discusses this 
topic in his journal article “The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty providing for an Objective 
Regime”
 
and highlights that that erga omnes obligations could result by application of the 
following principle from the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties principle.  
Article 36 
Treaties providing for rights for third States 
1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States 
to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall 
be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise 
provides. 
2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the 
conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with 
the treaty.  
As a result, under Article 36, a treaty may create rights for third States if the original parties 
so intend and the third party State assents. This assent is presumed as long as the contrary is 
not indicated. This article was codified by the International Law Commission after much 




In addition, erga omnes obligations may arise by conferring the status of International 
Customary Law upon a treaty under the process recognised in Article 38 of the Vienna 
Convention Law of Treaties
23
.  
Therefore, rules in a treaty can become binding on third party States through international 
custom. Nothing in Articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third party State as a customary rule of international law being recognized as 
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such. Unlike treaty law, which must be followed only by States that are parties to the 
agreement in question, international customary law is binding upon all states, no matter 
whether they have ratified a treaty, which contain the rule in question, or not. When states act 
consistently in their international and internal relations during a long period of time, these 
actions/practises become accepted by the international community as applicable law
24
. 
When viewing the Antarctic treaty through the lens of Articles 35 to 38 of the Vienna 
Convention Law of Treaties, in trying to fit it into an objective regime, we can make the 
following observations. Prima facie it appears that some of the Treaty obligations are phrased 
in objective terms, which could create the intention to establish obligations on third party 





paragraph 2, and article V
27
. Simma explains that it was assumed that such a reading would 
not render the Antarctic Treaty Article X useless, as it could have an interpretation that could 
be construed as only inter parties.  
The Madrid Protocol is a strongly worded document discussing environmental protection and 
uses objective wording. The Madrid Protocol bans all mining in Antarctica and states that 
Antarctica is a natural wilderness which is to be used for peaceful purposes and scientific 
research only. It was added to the Antarctic Treaty by member States in 1992 and due to its 
clear and objective wording, it adds clarity to the Treaty in this area. 
However, even if the Treaty is drafted with the intent of binding a third party State, the third 
party State will not have accepted the articles expressly. There is acknowledgement within 
the treaty of a wider community of non-member States, but there is no evidence to make 
those interests into enforceable rights
28
.  
The difficulty in finding the Antarctic Treaty as an objective regime valid erga omnes is 
therefore harder, as there has not been, in reality, consent from the non treaty parties. Since 
1983, debates at the United Nations have been strongly critical of the role of the Antarctic 
Treaty States in relation to Antarctica, and in light of these views any current acceptance of 
the treaty system as an objective regime may be difficult to establish. Charney highlights that 
he knows of no third party State that had expressly communicated to the Antarctic Treaty 
States that it intended to bind itself directly to any treaty obligations. However, he also points 
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out that under customary law a less formal indication of acceptance may be enough in some 
circumstances. Consequently, comments, either oral or written, made at United Nations 
meetings, in support of the Antarctic Treaty, could potentially have the ability to be held as 
enough to prove accession to the Antarctic Treaty by non-member States. However, the 
question does arise whether before the 1980’s, when the treaty had been in operation for 
some 20 years, the objective quality of the regime had become established with the 
acquiescence of the wider international community. 
In summary, under the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties, it does not appear possible that 
the Antarctic Treaty can produce valid erga omnes effects, as the silence of third parties can 
not be interpreted as assent. 
Although the Antarctic Treaty viewed as a whole is unlikely to be considered to have the 
necessary characteristics for an objective regime, certain parts of the Antarctic Treaty in 
isolation might achieve that standard. The following types of treaties have been held to be 
valid objective regimes and thus attract obligations erga omnes.  
Boundary Treaties - because of their sensitivity in international relations, have always 
been considered a classic example of objective regimes
29
. 
Treaties on International Waterways and Rivers - the regimes established under these 
are regarded as conferring rights on third states
30
.  In the Wimbledon case, the Court 




In State practice, frequent reference is made to treaties providing for demilitarization and 
neutralisation as producing effects erga omnes. State practice treaties acquire objective 
character due to their importance in the global community
32
. In light of this, it could be 
argued that the environmental and demilitarisation articles of the Antarctic Treaty could 
arguably be considered to have an objective character. Antarctica, its surrounding ice shelves 
and oceans play a vital role in the state of the global environment and it serves as an 
important venue for scientific research that may shed light on global environmental issues. 
This was highlighted when the expanding ozone hole over Antarctica was found, and the 
more recent problem of Illegal Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) fishing in the Antarctic 
territory and its effect on the world as a whole
33
. The Madrid protocol came into existence 
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due to these very issues. Antarctica plays a central role in the biodiversity, climate, and ozone 
regimes, among other things and may indeed create expectations of general compliance. In 
short such a treaty may come to be seen as reflecting legal standards of general applicability 
and as such must be deemed capable of creating rights and obligations both for third party 
States and third party organizations
34
. 
Certain environmental harm is identified as possibly widening the scope of erga omnes 
obligations that may be pursued by any party. Dinah Shelton explores the issue of common 
concern for humanity through the lens of the environment. Certain environmental harm has 
been identified as concerning to all which can impose a duty to co-operate. A duty that itself 
has shown to be enforceable. This could have the potential to be argued against third party 
states if a breach in environmental issues were to happen. 
However, there seems today, notwithstanding past arguments in its favour, very little legal 





Special Laws for Antarctica 
 
When looking into the development of laws which govern Antarctica it is important to understand 
that the normal means of enacting law does not apply as there is no single sovereign body. Because 
of this, any special laws for Antarctica would need to be based upon the development of 
international law and governed by the processes which create those laws36. 
The current situation is that the Antarctic Treaty has various norms which are accepted by treaty 
members which are accepted as law.  Over time, these normative statements have been accepted by 
not only the member States, but also by third party nations who have indicated that they accept 
many of the norms established by the Antarctic Treaty as law37. As a consequence, a number of 
international norms taken from the Antarctic Treaty have become assimilated into the rules of 
general international law binding on all States
38
.  
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The parties to the Antarctic Treaty have maintained unity in their efforts to promote the 
norms of the Antarctic Treaty. When there has been any sign that third States plan to 
undertake activities in the Antarctic that work against the norms established by the Antarctic 
Treaty. The Treaty Parties have reacted in a united manner to stop the actions of the third 
party States and successfully stopped what they were trying to do.  It is usual when third 
party States have an interest in undertaking activities in Antarctica they have, of their own 
accord placed themselves under the norms of the Antarctic Treaty. This has been done by 
either joining the Treaty or by acting in conjunction with a Treaty party
39
.  However the 
subject matter of the Antarctic has become more complex to govern, as more and more 
people are involved in the continent, in many different ways, including those involved in; 
Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing, Law of the Sea and Coastal State Antarctic, 
Tourism and Whaling. The capacity to manage and regulate will continue to be challenged by 
third party States, especially if the issue mineral exploitation arises.
40
 
The Antarctic Treaty still remains the foundation of Antarctic governance and needs to  retain 
legitimacy beyond  membership but to the International community as a whole as, 
Antarctica’s legal future is subject to the will of the international community. Any further 
developments will proceed upon the significant foundation of international law that cannot be 
easily displaced. It is highly likely that these norms: such as its nuclear free status will be 
kept in mind as members of the international community proceed to develop new Antarctic 
law. 
Although there are many theoretical arguments on whether the Antarctic Treaty parties can 
enforce obligation erga omnes on third party States. This is legal theory/ jurisprudence. And 
academia at its best, many different arguments from many different perspectives. The reality 
of the political environment is that essentially the Antarctic Treaty has worked as it has been 
adhered to by the international community at large. 
However, it must be acknowledged that there is growing interest in Antarctica, and it will be 
interesting to see the developments in Antarctic Laws, and which theories will hold up in 
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